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I. INTRODUCTION 
CommerciaP trademark2 counterfeiting3 in the United States is a problem which. 
threatens to go out of control. Largely ignored by the general press and dealt with only 
1 "Commercial" is used in this article to indicate those products placed in the stream of foreign 
or domestic commerce. It is only after such a placement that the harms of counterfeiting occur. 
2 There are many definitions of "trademark" - common law, statutory, ordinary usage, etc. -
and the proper meaning of the word at a given time depends on the context used. If, during this 
article, the reader is in doubt as to the exact meaning of "trademark" at any given time, the following 
definition should almost always apply: 
Any mark, word, letter, number, design, picture or combination thereof in any form or 
arrangement, which (a) is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods which he 
marks and; (b) is affixed to the goods and (c) is not ... a common or generic name for the 
goods or a picture of them, or a geographical, personal or corporate or other associa-
tion name, or a design descriptive of the goods or their quality, ingredients, properties 
or functions and; (d) the use of which is prohibited neither by legislative enactment nor 
an otherwise defined public policy." REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 715 (1954). 
3 Again, there is much confusion surrounding the definition of the word "counterfeiting" and it 
also must be defined contextually. Generally, in this article "counterfeiting" refers to the act of 
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fragmentarily by specialized publications, the modern counterfeiter remains shrouded 
behind antiquated myths and consumer misconceptions. The result is only a few voices 
crying out for relief from the counterfeiter's fraud. Unfortunately, ignoring the problem 
has not made it go away. Dozens of people across the world have been killed by defective 
counterfeit products, hundreds of thousands of jobs in the United States have been lost to 
foreign counterfeit operations overseas, billions of dollars in revenue have been lost by 
legitimate U.S. manufacturers, and millions of consumers have been defrauded by coun-
terfeit products, but there has been very little public action against the problem. It has 
only recently become a federal crime to even sell a counterfeit product.4 
Current federal, state, and local legislation against counterfeiters acts as an earthen 
dam attempting to restrain a tidal wave. Officials entrusted by the public with the duty of 
providing protection from counterfeit products freely admit they are overwhelmed by the 
flood of imports arriving daily.5 Although it is widely accepted that trademark counter-
feiting is an international problem,· there is no international agreement that relates 
primarily to counterfeiting.7 Federallegislation8 and international treaties9 which would 
attempt to act on the problem have until only very recently been languishing in commit-
tees unable to agree on how to solve the problem or if there even is a problem.10 Most 
importantly, during this period of political indecisiveness, commercial trademark coun-
attempting to deceive consumers into purchasing inferior merchandise by affixing to it counterfeit 
trademarks of quality brand manufacturers. Unlike other types of trademark infringement, which 
may involve the unintentional use of merely confusing or similar marks, commercial counterfeiting 
involves the intentional duplication (more or less) of the trademark owner's mark. Although there is 
much potential overlap in terms, such trade practices as "gray market sales" (the selling of goods 
bearing an authorized trademark but sold in contravention of a commercial arrangement), "parallel 
sales" (the legal production of trademarked goods by a licensee which are sold in markets restricted 
by the licensing agreement), "diverted sales" (goods produced legally with legitimate trademarks by 
licensees who deliberately overproduce and let the surplus go unreported to the trademark owner), 
"passing off' (the simulation of a trademark or packaging when the trademark is not identical nor 
likely to cause consumer confusion), or other forms of unfair competition such as the unauthorized 
use of a trademark on a nonsimilar product, copyright, or patent infringement, are not covered by 
the use of the word "counterfeit" unless the contextual situation suggests otherwise. Nor, obviously, 
does the word mean the counterfeiting of money or money substitutes (credit cards). 
4 Rakoff and Wolff, Commercial Counteifeiting and the Proposed Trademark Counteifeiting Act, 20 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 147 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Rakoff and Wolff). 
5 See, e.g., The Trademark Counteifeiting Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2428 Before the Senate Judiciary 
Subcomm. on Criminal Law, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-46 (1982) (testimony of Simon P. Gourdine, 
Commissioner, N ew York City Department of Consumer Affairs) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 
2428]. 
6 Walker, The Pirating of Brand Goods, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1981, at D2. 
7 Walker, A Program to Combat International Commercial Counteifeiting, 70 TRADEMARK REp. 118 
(1981). 
8 The recently enacted Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1983 is the only current legislation 
that directly addresses the counterfeiting problem. See infra text accompanying notes 203-47. 
9 The Anticounterfeiting Code under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, formally 
titled "Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods," is the predom-
inant proposed international attempt to address counterfeiting. See infra text accompanying notes 
289-95. 
10 See, e.g., The Trademark Counteifeiting Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Judiciary 
Subcomm. on Criminal Law, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-21 (1983) (testimony of Edward T. Borda, 
President, Association of General Merchandise Chains, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 
875]. 
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terfeiting has become one of the world's few major growth industries,11 to the detriment 
of both the industrialized and Third World countriesY 
II. THE IMPACT AND MYTHS OF THE COUNTERFEITER 
A. The History of Trademark Counterfeiting 
The purpose of a trademark is to place in the public's mind, through the use of a 
distinctive name,logo, or mark, an expectation of quality that by itself will distinguish the 
trademarked product or service from all others. I3 The use of trademarks, exclusive to 
particular producers, is not a recent development; the ancient Romans placed trident 
shaped marks on the caps of their wine amphoras.H The English Parliament in 1266 
required bakers to put an exclusive mark upon their bread to identify its source. I5 Given 
human nature and the inflated prices consumers are willing to pay for trademarked 
goods on the expectation of receiving a higher quality product, it was inevitable that the 
efforts of producers to identify their products would be undermined by those producing 
inferior products but wishing to make an easy profit on the reputation of others. After 
Roman wine became the epitome of fine drink throughout the Empire and beyond, the 
merchants of Gaul began scratching the Roman trident trademark distinguishing the 
famous wines of Campania onto jugs of their mediocre wine. I6 
The increasing use and dependence of producers on trademarks since the Industrial 
Revolution has always been followed by a corresponding increase in counterfeiting. For 
example, in the United States the explosive growth of the national economy immediately 
after the Civil War led to an increased dependence on national trademarks registered 
under the Trademark Act of 1870. This economic growth was accompanied by a nation-
wide increase in counterfeiting so dramatic that the Act was amended in 1876 to include 
criminal sanctionsY 
Conditions were ideal for counterfeiting immediately after World War II. In the first 
three decades of this century, designer labels had begun to appear on almost every 
product imaginable. The use of designer labels was prompted, in part, by an increase in 
product advertisement. Many of these products were unavailable during World War II 
and demand for them failed to slacken during the war. This enormous public need could 
simply not be filled by legitimate producers at the end of the war. Counterfeiters moved 
in to take up the slack.ls France, long the leader in luxury goods and fashion trends, was 
11 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 1. 
12 The term "Third World" means various things to different people. Greene, Towards a 
Definition of the Term Third World, I B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13 (1980). In this article, the term Third 
World will refer to those undeveloped countries of the world, in Asia, Africa, or in the Americas that 
are not politically aligned with the Communist or non-Communist nations, and those people, while 
not particularly members of Third World countries as defined above, collectively identified with the 
ethnic background or economic underdevelopment of those in such nations. 
13 It is the value of this consumer expectation that gives the product its intrinsic or economic 
worth, not the fact that the product has been labeled with a trademark guaranteed to be exclusive by 
the: manufacturer. 
14 Paster, Trademarks - Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 554 (1969). 
15 Kaikati and LaGarce, Beware of International Brand Piracy, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 
52 [hereinafter cited as Kaikati and LaGarce]. 
16 Lewis, A Show of Fraud, Int'l Herald Trib., Apr. 13, 1979, at 14. 
17 4 CONGo REc. 4775 (1876). 
18 Kaikati and LaGarce, supra note 15, at 52. 
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the first nation to suffer the brunt of full-scale modern counterfeiting in the Post-World 
War II era. In 1954, the besieged French brand name producers formed the Comite 
Colbomit to protect their goods against counterfeiters.19 In contrast, American manufac-
turers did not form the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition until April 1978.20 
Since 1945, two factors have helped the counterfeiter expand his markets and 
profits: the increased internationalization of the world economy, and the development of 
duplicating technologies. The advent of worldwide communications and the increased 
business activity of multinational corporations has resulted in the international recogni-
tion of, and desire for, specific brand names.21 This growing international consumer 
interest in the status value of purchasing designer products has resulted, for example, in 
counterfeiters putting fake Cartier labels on book jackets, dresses, and pencils, products 
that Cartier itself does not produce.22 In addition, the internationalization of the opera-
tions of legitimate manufacturers has, for economic reasons,23 prompted counterfeiters to 
follow suit. This has further complicated jurisdictional questions for the former group 
and increased the efficiency of the latter. 
The increased availability and precision of modern duplicating technologies allows 
the counterfeiter to make exact copies of consumer products and trademark labels. 
Sharper images in offset printing, for example, have made it possible for almost anyone 
to duplicate product labels.24 Raymond Fink, the Assistant Secretary and attorney for the 
Gates Rubber Company, a worldwide supplier of automobile parts, has publicly stated 
that "some of the counterfeit fan belts made in Taiwan come in packages that are so 
identical [to the real packaging] that it wasn't until we steamed [a] seam open that we saw a 
difference."25 Further advances in duplicating technologies can only aid the counterfeiter 
in deceiving the public.26 
B. The Myths Protecting the Counterfeiter 
An examination of the trademark counterfeiting problem will dispel three major 
myths which serve to protect the counterfeiter from the mobilization of public opinion. 
First and foremost is the consumer misconception that only expensive, designer-name 
articles are counterfeited. To this way of thinking, the counterfeiting problem is no more 
serious than buying a watch that does not work or a pair of jeans that prematurely fall 
apart. The second myth is that the counterfeiter indirectly benefits the public by provid-
ing expensive looking but low cost items which allow the less wealthy to experience the 
lifestyle of the rich. The third myth is that counterfeiters run essentially "mom and 
pop"-scale businesses which hurt very few people and provide employment for only a few, 
relatively harmless, crooks. 
Each myth will be examined in turn but all have one fact in common: they each 
19 [d. at 53. 
20 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 147. 
21 Conlon, Commercial Product Counterfeiting: An Overview, in 1 A PRACTICAL ApPROACH TO 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS 273, 274-75 (1981) cited in Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 
148. 
22 [d. 
23 Such factors include economies of scale, mass production facilities, national transportation 
networks, wage differentials, anti-union legislation, and tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
24 Kaikati and LaGarce, supra note 15, at 54. 
25 Beach, Fighting Copycat Products, USA Today, Jan. 30, 1984, at Bl. 
26 Kaikati and LaGarce, supra note 15, at 54. 
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present a view of counterfeiting which is decades old. Though they may have provided an 
accurate description of counterfeiting in 1945, they do not today. These consumer 
misconceptions are not limited to any nation or any class. They are perpetuated by 
anecdotal personal experiences with counterfeits, apathy on the part of the media toward 
the problem, and the public's misperception of the industry in generaJ.27 In the next 
section, each of the three myths will be discussed in detail. 
1. The First Myth: "It's only luxury items." 
The association between counterfeiting and luxury items is long and well-established. 
Traditionally, the goods most often targeted by counterfeiters are consumer goods with 
strong brand-name identification and high price markups based on the brand name, such 
as fashion apparel,jewelry, watches, records, and tapes.28 As mentioned earlier, France, 
the international center of luxury items in 1945, was the first nation to be plagued by the 
modern counterfeiter. The production of these goods tended to be labor-intensive, 
allowing free and inexpensive entrance into the market.29 High fashion articles are still an 
attractive target for counterfeiters, as are other, though more mundane, "status" articles. 
For example, the chances of purchasing a counterfeit tape or record is now estimated to 
be one in five, a counterfeit pair of sunglasses one in four, and a counterfeit Cartier watch 
even higher.30 In fact, more counterfeit Cartier watches are sold in the United States 
alone than are actually produced by Cartier for worldwide distribution.3 ! 
Unfortunately, many counterfeiters attracted by the high profit and limited risk 
associated with counterfeiting, have expanded into a greater variety of consumer and 
industrial goods, including capital-intensive goods such as computer hardware, automo-
bile parts, and pharmaceutical drugs. The following examples illustrate the scope and 
depth of their activities: 
- The Bell Helicopter Company attributes several fatal crashes to coun-
terfeited rotor gears not manufactured to proper stress tolerances and a 
British bus manufacturer traced a series of fatal brake failures to counterfeit 
brake drums improperly cast in Taiwan.32 
- In February 1977, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) discov-
ered and ordered the immediate removal of counterfeit "Boeing" engine fire 
detection and control systems on 100 Boeing 737's. Several companies had 
marketed the systems with fake "Boeing" labels and serial numbers, leading 
their airline customers to believe the parts had been certified by FAA rep-
resentatives as safe. In fact, the systems had not been approved, and when the 
FAA and Boeing engineers examined the counterfeit products they discov-
ered poor workmanship, low-quality materials, and inadequate safety stan-
dards.33 
27 Frank, Do You Know What You Are Buying?, Saturday Evening Post, July 9, 1955, at 28. 
28 The Effects of Foreign Product Counteifeiting on U.S. Industry, in THE UNITED STATES INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE COMMISSION PUBLICATION 1479,Jan. 1984, at ix [hereinafter cited as USITC PUBLICA-
TION 1479]. 
29 Id. 
30 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 35. 
31 Phony Cartiers Take a Licking, L.A. Examiner (evening edition), Oct. 14, 1981, at A8. 
32 CONGo REc., Apr. 22, 1982, at S3929. 
33 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 150. 
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- In 1976, counterfeit transistors were discovered among parts destined 
for use in the United States Space Shuttle.34 
- In 1978, substandard counterfeit components were discovered among 
parts intended for use on several defense weapon system projects, including 
the F-4 fighter plane and the Chaparral and Lance missile systems.35 
- Counterfeit power transmission belts ("V -belts") for use in both 
helicopters and automobiles displaying the Gates label have been discovered 
in Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, and India, among other 
nations. These belts only last five percent as long as their genuine counter-
parts.36 
- Counterfeit polio vaccines37 and tetracycline38 have been distributed to 
unsuspecting patients. Counterfeit drugs are believed to be the cause of more 
than twelve deaths, among them the death of a seventeen year old boy from 
New Mexico who lapsed into a coma after ingesting two counterfeit bipheta-
mines. Several other victims have suffered paralysis linked to counterfeit 
drugs. a9 Dr. David E. Smith ofthe Haight-Ashbury Free Medical Clinic in San 
Francisco has reported that much of the street use of methaqualone (known 
as Quaaludes when produced by the Lemmon Company and still widely sold 
under their trademark) is so contaminated with "a grab bag of miscellaneous 
additives including barbiturates, arthritis medicines, o-toluidine (a toxic 
methaqualone precursor used in manufacturing dyes) and epoxy glue" that 
treating overdoses or adverse reactions is almost impossible.40 
- In May 1978, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration recalled 357 
heart pumps used in 266 hospitals across the United States. The recall was 
ordered because the $20,000 intra-aortic balloon pumps, which simulate a 
patient'S heartbeat during open heart surgery, were believed to contain po-
tentially defective counterfeit components worth about eight dollars eachY 
- Various counterfeit cosmetics have been known to cause skin irrita-
tion, rashes, allergic reactions, and facial scarring.42 
- Kenya's annual coffee crop, a mainstay of its fragile economy, was 
virtually destroyed in 1979-1980 by the application of counterfeit and defec-
tive agricultural chemicals bearing the counterfeit label of the Chevron Cor-
poration. The Corporation suffered much of the blame for the loss.43 
These examples demonstrate that there is practically no limit to what the counterfei-
ter will copy. According to Peter Jones, Senior Vice-President of Legal and External 
Affairs of the Levi-Strauss Company, the largest manufacturer of branded apparel in the 
world, "If a product can be copied and sold with a counterfeit trademark at a profit, the 
34Id. 
35 Mosier, Issue 39 - Count Indictment in Counteifeit Parts Case, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Dec. 4, 
1978, at 1. 
36 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 51. 
37 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 150. 
38 Hearings on.S. 2428, supra note 5, at 40. 
39 AMA Says 'Look-Alike'Drugs are Deadly, United Press International, Apr. 2, 1982 (available on 
NEXIS). 
40 Smith and Symour, Methaqualone -Abuse Portfolio, HIGH TIMES MAGAZINE,July 1984, at 30. 
4! Heart Pumps, Associated Press Release, May 10, 1978 (available on NEXIS) cited in Rakoff and 
Wolff, supra note 4, at 150. 
42 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 52. 
43 Speech of Donald D. Kieffer, General Counsel, U.S. Trade Representative, Keystone, Col-
orado (Jan. 28, 1982), European Chemical Ring Exposed, Weekly Review, Feb. 20, 1981, both cited in 
Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 151. 
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odds are very great that bogus products will find their way into the stream of com-
merce."44 
It should also be noted that no consumer is truly safe from purchasing a counterfeit 
product. As noted earlier, many are exact duplicates of the real item. A lower price is not 
indicative of whether an item is or is not a counterfeit,45 so comparison shopping fails as a 
protective alternative. Due to the settled anti-trust policy against retail (or resale) price 
maintenance,46 brand name manufacturers have little control over the ultimate retail 
distribution of their goods.47 Middlemen are able to sell products to almost any store, 
anywhere, to promote competition and lower prices, so only shopping in "high quality" or 
"up-scale" stores is no true protection. Truly no consumer is safe from possible deception. 
It has been reported that Mitsukoshi, Tokyo's most prestigious department store, un-
knowingly sold a fake Hermes necktie to the Emperor. 48 
2. The Second Myth: "Counterfeits are inexpensive alternatives for the poor." 
While counterfeits are usually visually indistinguishable from their genuine counter-
parts, it is generally agreed that counterfeits are usually inferior in quality to the original 
product.49 Counterfeits of wearing apparel and footwear tend to show less precise work-
manship and may be made from inferior materials. Counterfeit cosmetics and toiletries 
may not be sterile, and perfumes and colognes are often entirely different in composition. 
Counterfeit agricultural chemicals and pharmaceutical drugs may be totally ineffective 
diluted variations of the genuine article, or composed entirely of neutral or poisonous 
agents. Counterfeit transportation equipment parts have been reported to be manufac-
tured from inferior raw materials, lacking non-visible safety features, or made to impre-
cise specifications. Counterfeit electrical circuit breakers and various other electrical 
consumer goods have been found to be unable to withstand normal or rated electrical 
loads. Counterfeit records and tapes tend to exhibit inferior audio and/or video repro-
duction.50 
The difference between counterfeit and legitimate merchandise is for the most part 
purely operational. Inferior stitching does not prevent a piece of apparel from being 
worn; it does, however, suggest a shorter product life span.51 In some cases, counterfeits 
can serve equally as well as the genuine article; a $20 watch with a Cartier label can keep 
time as well as a $2,000 genuine watch.52 It is this operational versus cosmetic trade-off 
that causes much consumer confusion regarding the quality of counterfeits. If it feels like 
a pair of Levis, looks like a pair of Levis, and wears like a pair of Levis (at least for the first 
week) consumers tend to discount apparel life against the reduced cost, especially if the 
article is purchased purely for social status reasons. While this superficial logic may work 
if the counterfeit article is purchased at a reduced price from that of the original, it fails if 
the article is bought at an equal or greater price, or if the article is a safety-related item 
44 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 36. 
45 Id. at 25. 
46 For an explanation and discussion of resale price maintenance, see infra text accompanying 
not~s 223-3l. 
47 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 15. 
48 Kaikati and LaGarce, supra note 15, at 53. 
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where its quality is literally a matter of life and death. The potentially disastrous results 
are well illustrated by the examples listed in the first section, above. 
3. The Third Myth: "It's only 'mom and pop' operations." 
The word "counterfeiter" conjures up images in the minds of some consumers of 
older American couples who press phony Adidas labels onto sweatshirts for sale at local 
flea markets.There is, however, widespread agreement that this public perception is 
wrong. Modern commercial counterfeiters, far from being "mom and pop" operations, 
operate with elaborate management structures, extensive divisions of employee labor, 
and sophisticated systems of retail distribution.53 The size of some counterfeiting opera-
tions rivals that of multinational corporations in terms of their manufacturing, exporting, 
transportation, and distribution systems both within the United States and abroad. 
The vast majority of counterfeit goods sold in the United States are manufactured 
abroad and imported into the United States.54 Most of the goods are manufactured in 
Asia, especially Taiwan, but also in South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, 
and Thailand.55 Italy is also involved in the counterfeiting of luxury items, especially 
sunglasses.56 The United States is the largest single market for foreign counterfeits; the 
U.S. International Trade Commission estimates that over sixty percent of the world's 
counterfeits destined for export are sold in the United States.57 However, the Third 
World is not only a source of counterfeit products headed towards the industrialized 
world. Many lesser-developed countries (LDCs) have well-developed, internalized coun-
terfeiting operations that supplement legitimate but inadequate supplies of consumer 
products. Uruguay, for example, has an established counterfeiting industry producing 
jeans and T-shirts primarily for domestic consumption;58 Nigeria and India are increas-
ingly relying on internally produced counterfeit automobile parts to meet increasing 
consumer demand.59 Other nations, such as Panama, Turkey, and Spain, export whatever 
counterfeits are not consumed internally.60 It should also be noted that, occasionally, 
industrialized nations act as source nations for counterfeits for the Third World. The 
Netherlands, for example, is a source of counterfeit home computer software, records 
and tapes, and agricultural chemicals for many African nations, as well as the rest of 
Europe.61 
Many LDCs act as conduits for illegally produced goods through trade practices not 
precisely considered counterfeiting, such as grey market sales and diverted sales.62 Coun-
terfeiters can also circumvent the punitive impact of internationally imposed trade restric-
tions. The Republic of South Africa, for example, has almost given tacit approval to its 
growing counterfeit industry to placate domestic demand for consumer goods.63 
It is generally recognized that no cash-starved, developing nation can resist the 
53 Conlon, supra note 21, at 276-77. 
54 Walker, supra note 7, at D2. 
55 Id. 
56 USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 27. 
57 Id. at xiii. 
58 Id. at 28. 
59 Id. at 27-28. 
6°Id. 
61 Id. at 28. 
62 Id. at 25-26. For a definition of gray market and diverted sales, see supra note 3. 
63 For example, South Africa has a large and growing counterfeit video cassette industry that 
primarily produces to satisfy domestic demand. Id. at 28. 
1985] COMMERCIAL TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING 159 
seductive lures counterfeiters can offer. Counterfeiting provides employment, both direct 
and indirect,64 at no visible cost to the government. LDC consumers hungry for spare 
parts or Western designer label items are satisfied by inexpensive counterfeits, sparing 
their national economy the negative economic consequences of importation.65 Enforce-
ment against counterfeiters, prompted by Western government pressures for reform, 
diverts finite resources toward police and customs enforcement, rather than toward other 
urgently needed social or economic development programs. Reliance on counterfeiting 
may satisfy short-term consumer needs but it will never provide the necessary capital 
formation66 or promote the realistic economic atmosphere67 required for true consumer 
64 Direct employment is provided by the actual production and assembly of counterfeit products 
and their components, usually still a labor-intensive activity in many LDCs. Indirect employment is 
provided to LDCs by counterfeiters through the transportation, domestic retail distribution and sale, 
and export systems that must be created to handle the flow of counterfeit goods. The real difference 
between the two types of employment is that the national governments of the afflicted nations may 
occasionally be underwriting the cost of counterfeit distribution and sale by sponsoring the develop-
ment of legitimate retail distribution infrastructures, which are then used, without compensation, by 
counterfeiters bent on promoting the "legitimacy" of their products. However, such an incidental 
cost has not yet been quantified. 
65 The most serious national economic consequence avoided is the effect the import of con-
sumer goods would have on the LDCs' balance of trade. Since counterfeit goods are produced or 
imported covertly, no record is kept of such transactions, with no corresponding effect on national 
trade receipts. Also, where unlabeled merchandise is imported into a nation and the counterfeit 
trademark affixed in the nation where the product will eventually be sold, its original value is 
considerably less when entering the nation than when it is eventually sold with the trade name 
markup, further artificially understating the value of national imports. These understatements, in 
turn, a(fect the value of the national currency in international monetary markets, depress fiscal tax 
and tariff receipts available for collection, and may add inflationary pressures to already overex-
tended economies. 
66 See generally, M. BRYANT AND L. WHITE, MANAGING DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 
(1982); R. KINDLEBERGER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1958); G. LITTLE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT-
THEORY, POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1982); K. AGARWALA AND A. SINGH, THE ECONOMICS 
OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1958); F. WATERSTON, DEVELOPMENT PLANNING - LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 
(1965); Science and Technologyfor Development, Report on the U.N. Conference on the Application of 
Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, U.N. Publication 63.1.24, 
E/CONF.39/l, Vol. IV (1963). 
67 There appears to be a progression within the LDCs, especially those in Asia, from pure 
counterfeiting through the means of consumer deception, such as passing off, to the creation of 
original but somewhat identical trademarks registered with the national government. In an LDC, the 
first order of government business is to promote domestic production and export sales for internal 
economic benefits. This may be accomplished through counterfeiting or any of the other related 
forms of trademark infringement (passing off or gray market sales, etc.) because the existing brand 
names and trademarks already have an established demand, both domestic and abroad, and demand 
often exceeds the capacity of legitimate licensees. Also, because there are often few or no legal 
impediments to such cooperation between trademark infringers and LDC governments, the particu-
lar cultures involved may attach no stigma to counterfeiting. The initial counterfeiting then appears 
to give way to the gray areas, such as diverted sales, as trade is increased and the counterfeiting is 
attacked by rightful trademark holders. Finally, the former counterfeit industry develops and 
registers its own trademarks to legitimately compete with legal producers and simultaneously at-
temp~s to increase its acquisition of legitimate licenses, at which point this counterfeit industry 
becomes the target of other counterfeiters, both domestic and foreign. Given the nature of this 
progression, legitimate manufacturers will not attempt to compete or produce their products in these 
nations, dooming them to a continual and growing reliance on illegitimate producers to satisfy 
consumer demand. This point is dramatically illustrated by the empirical observation that counter-
feiting never completely disappears from a country, regardless of the approach taken by legitimate 
manufacturers, once it is established. USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 25-26. 
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product industrialization and distribution. The lack of minimally effective legislation 
against counterfeiting in many Third World countries68 indicates that the Third World 
will remain a safe harbor and market for counterfeiters for some time to come. 
The financing and import/export schemes of some counterfeiters would make 
legitimate producers envious. In one example, goods manufactured in Taiwan were 
shipped to a free-trade zone in Brooklyn - where they got "made in the United States" 
documentation - and then were shipped to the Canary Islands for distribution in Europe 
and Africa.69 In a bizarre case reported by Peter T. Jones, Chairman of the International 
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition/a in testimony before the Judiciary Committee of the 
United States Senate, an operation with its manufacturing base in Taiwan was being 
managed by three Englishmen, one of whom was a member of the boards of directors of 
some of the most distinguished companies in Great Britain. This operation was producing 
one million pairs of designer jeans annually, with a marketing plan that had hoped in five 
years to spread manufacturing operations throughout Southeast Asia and move two 
million units out of Taiwan alone each year. In Hong Kong, the managing partner of one 
of the world's largest accounting firms collaborated with them on the accounting side, 
arranging for warehouses in Switzerland that were receiving deliveries of 100,000 units 
by ship.71 While the magnitude of this operation is certainly unusual, it is indicative of the 
sophistication of counterfeiting operations worldwide.72 
Once counterfeit goods reach the shores of the United States, their distribution can 
also be quite sophisticated. In a 1982 example, Designer Sportswear, Inc. was a New York 
corporation distributing counterfeit designer jeans to more than five hundred legitimate 
retailers throughout the United States. The company's eight top executives divided 
among themselves such specialized duties as bribing bankers and obtaining phony credit 
references. 73 This example is hardly the largest that has been uncovered and is quite 
typical. 74 The existence of extensive counterfeit distribution networks is hardly surprising 
since the same economic factors that favor the widespread distribution of trademarked 
goods similarly favor a widespread distribution of counterfeits.75 
In the United States, "mom and pop" counterfeiters who press phony Adidas labels 
onto sweatshirts for sale at the local flea market certainly do exist. But since most 
68 While most nations have some form of legislation concerning the registration and priorities 
established for trademark owners, few LDCs have trademark infringement laws that could actively 
be used to pursue counterfeiters. For example, Nigeria'S Trade Marks Act of 1965, its primary 
trademark statute, contains no provision for barring infringing imports by its customs authorities. 
Neither does Singapore's Trademark Act, Hong Kong's Trademark Ordinance No. 47 of 1954, 
Mexico's Law on Inventions and Marks of 1976, the Republic of Korea's Trademark Law (Law No. 
71 of Nov. 28, 1949), or Saudi Arabia's High Decree No. 8762 of 28.7 1358 S.H. and Royal Decree 
No. M/24 of 23.6 1394 S.H., all of which are primary national trademark laws. Counterfeiting is 
rarely expressly prohibited - infringement, as with the U.S. Lanham Act, is the ultimate menace the 
statute attacks - and when it is, such as under Taiwan's Trademark Law (as amended, Jan. 26, 
1983), the process for bringing suit under the statute is so awkward and cumbersome it is rarely used 
given the volume of counterfeiting. See infra text accompanying notes 297-98. 
17. 
69 Walker, supra note 6, at D2. 
70 Mr. Jones' additional qualifications are given, supra, in text accompanying note 44. 
71 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 52. 
72 [d. at 51-52. 
73 Makers of Designer Goods Starting to Crack Down on Counterfeiting, Wall St. j., June 28, 1982, at 
74 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 147. 
75 [d. at 148. 
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counterfeits are sold in discount stores run by legitimate businessmen,16 and most are 
imports, it appears that some of the original unsophisticated labor-intensive counterfeit 
operations have internationalized and grown since World War II, in keeping with the 
world economy in general. 
C. The Impact on U.S. Industry 
Although statistics are obviously not kept in this type of business,77 it is estimated that 
commercial trademark counterfeiting costs American business up to twenty billion dollars 
annually in lost sales. In addition, up to 300,000 jobs have been exported overseas.78 
These statistics fail to take into account the loss of goodwill caused when a counterfeit 
product fails and a bias is created against the legitimate product by the defrauded owner 
unaware his product is not genuine9 or the price suppression caused when a legitimate 
manufacturer or retailer is forced to cut prices when competing against a counterfeit, 
usually not knowing his competitor is selling counterfeit merchandise.so Despite these 
statistics, most American retailers still do not feel counterfeiting is a serious problem,S! 
certainly not one requiring federal legislation.s2 
The cost of U.S. industry efforts to combat foreign counterfeiting by identifying 
counterfeiters and prosecuting under local laws, and by registration of their trademarks 
internationally, rose from $4.1 million in 1980 to $5 million in 1981 and to $12.1 million 
in 1982.s3 Even so, many manufacturers are not openly fighting counterfeiters and are 
praying they will not be dragged into litigation by adverse publicity. Some manufacturers 
fear that a detected counterfeit, once publicized, will hurt their reputations and sales as 
other consumers avoid all products bearing that trademark because of the fear of being 
defrauded.s4 Some U.S. manufacturers may not be aware that their products are being 
counterfeited and sold in this country or abroad. Of those counterfeits actually found, 
detection is most frequently left to private investigators or trademark watch services and 
alert wholesale and retail salespersons, buyers, distributors, and field personnel.S5 Even if 
76 USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at xii. 
77 Since most of the data involved in attempting to quantify the sales and employment impact of 
counterfeiters on the United States and on American industries is obviously soft, an effort will be 
made to present alternate estimates of impact where appropriate. 
78 Beach, supra note 25, at B 1. The USITC estimates these statistics to be $5.5 billion in sales and 
approximately 131,000 jobs. Commissioner Paula Stern of the USITC notes that the figure of 
131,000 jobs lost ill 1982 is an estimate based on figures provided by selected industries canvassed by 
the Commission staff and then further derived from the standard calculations of the labor content of 
U.S. output, imports, and exports. For a full methodological breakdown of the statistic, see USITC 
PUBLICATION 1445, U.S. TRADE-RELATED EMPLOYMENT, Investigation No. 332-154 (1983). The esti-
mates given in the text of the article, although widely bantered about in discussions of the counter-
feiting problem, are to the author's knowledge without methodological breakdown. A statistic of$16 
billion in losses for American industry due to counterfeiting has been attributed to the U.S. 
Department of Justice. Although widely quoted, the source of the statistic is unknown to the 
Department! Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 17 (testimony of William F. Baxter, Assistant 
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division). 
79 USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at xvi. 
8°Id. 
8! Id. at xix. The position of retailers is that counterfeiting is a problem for manufacturers and 
VICe versa. 
82 Id. at xx. 
83 I d. at xvii. 
84 Id. at 55. 
85 Id. at 55-56. 
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a counterfeit source is detected, the difficult task of identifying its actual location and its 
owners and operators confounds all but the most determined investigators. Costly inves-
tigative efforts are often stymied because the geographic market and jurisdiction in which 
a counterfeit is detected is not always the same as the market and jurisdiction in which it 
was manufactured. As a result, many manufacturers are hard pressed to collect evidence 
against counterfeiters even though they know their identity.86 The foreign product 
counterfeiter is also a shrewd and elusive businessman who is quick to run when and if the 
legitimate manufacturer pursues him.87 Overall, the self-help remedies available for 
trademark registrants are considered totally ineffectual in attempting to stem the growing 
tide of imported counterfeits.88 
The incidence of counterfeiting in the five major manufacturing industries affected 
by counterfeiters89 increased during the period 1980-1982.90 It appears that counterfeit-
ing in two of the industries, the wearing apparel and footwear industry, and the record 
and tape industry, has matured to the point that, generally, as soon as the industries 
eliminate the source of a particular counterfeit product, new counterfeits of the product 
are introduced from other sources.9! Even U.S. counterfeiting of domestic products92 
appears to be on the increase,93 a trend suggesting the growing audacity of American 
counterfeiters. U.S. export markets have also been targeted by counterfeiters; both the 
number of counterfeited products and the diversity of counterfeit merchandise available 
has increased dramatically since 1980.94 Overall export sales have dropped as legitimate 
products are forced to compete with their counterfeit counterparts, sometimes on the 
same discount store shelf, throughout Asia, South America, and Europe.95 These statistics 
must be compared against the disappointing reality that although industry efforts against 
counterfeiters have almost tripled from 1980 to 1982,96 confiscations of counterfeit goods 
have fallen when adjusted for inflation.97 
III. DOMESTIC ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM 
From the size, impact, and growth rates of commercial trademark counterfeiting in 
the United States and worldwide, it is clear that current efforts to stop the flow of 
86 The expense involved in bringing a single large international counterfeiter to court, from 
identification to final judgment, can exceed $500,000. Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 56 
(testimony of Edward Brown, Manager, International Special Services of the A.T. Cross Export 
Company, describing the situation of the Cross Company). 
87 USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 55. 
88 Hearings on S. 875, supra note 10, at 51-52 (testimony of James L. Bikoff, President and 
Executive Director of the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition). For a discussion of the civil, 
self-help remedies currently available for trademark registrants, see infra text accompanying notes 
98-186. 
89 These industries include wearing apparel and footwear, chemicals and related products, 
transportation equip'ment parts and accessories, records and tapes, and sporting goods. 
90 USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at x. 
9! [d. 
92 For example, Texas onions are sold as the famous onions of Vidalia, Georgia. 
93 USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at x. 
94 I d. at xiii. 
95 Id. at 26-54. 
96 See supra text accompanying note 83. 
97 Confiscation values provided by the U.S. Customs Service are not inflation adjusted. Fifty-five 
million dollars in counterfeit goods were seized by the combined efforts of manufacturers and the 
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counterfeit goods are not working. This conclusion represents the vast consensus of the 
experts.98 Current attempts to stop counterfeiting include a series of complicated, mostly 
federal, civil statutes, a handful of state and local criminal statutes, and some international 
treaties. All of these provide minor penalties which most counterfeiters write off as a cost 
of doing business99 or a potential minor legal inconvenience. A discussion of each type of 
legislation follows. 
A. Civil Statutes 
1. The Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act lOO is the principal federal statute relating to trademarks in the 
United States. It establishes a federal registration system for trademarks, accords regis-
tered trademarks certain benefits not available under state law, and provides remedies for 
infringement of registered marks. lol The registration system is two-tiered, and is com-
prised of a Principal Register and a Supplemental Register. Benefits accrue largely to the 
trademarks on the Principal Register. lo2 Infringement is defined as a simulation of the 
mark which causes a likelihood of confusion. 103 Counterfeit marks are dealt with expressly 
by the provisions of the Lanham Act. lo4 
The trademark owner can commence actions for infringement by filing a complaint 
in the U.S. district court having personal jurisdiction over the defendant. lo5 The court 
may enjoin future infringement and make an award for past infringement.106 Registrants 
have a wide range of remedies available to them, including the defendant's profits, treble 
damages, destruction of all labels and signs with the offending trademark, and the 
destruction of all plates, molds, and other equipment used to reproduce the mark.107 A 
preliminary injunction is the usual relief grantedlo8 and temporary restraining orders 
("TROs") may be issued in advance of any preliminary injunction. Such TROs may be 
issued ex parte and may include search and seizure orders supervised by U.S. marshals. lo9 
Customs Service in both 1980 and 1981; the U.S. inflation rate was at almost double digit levels. 
USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 50. 
98 This is the conclusion of any of the experts that testified for either the Trademark Counter-
feiting Act of 1982 or 1983. See Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5; Hearings on S. 875, supra note 10. It 
also cannot be logically denied that something is wrong with current enforcement since the level of 
counterfeiting in the United States continues to rise annually. 
99 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 163. 
100 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976). 
101 The right to exclusive use of a trademark in the United States, unlike other countries, is 
created by use and not registration. Trademarks cannot be registered under the Lanham Act unless 
they are already in use in interstate or foreign commerce. Although the Lanham Act is primarily 
directed towards registered trademarks, section 43(a) has been widely interpreted by the courts to 
protect unregistered trademarks as well. USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 7. 
102 [d. 
103 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1976). 
104 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976). 
105 Appeal is to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals; further review is possible to the 
U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari. 
106 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-17 (1976). 
107 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1976). 
108 See, Fiamb-Finanziaria Maglificio Biellese Fratelli Fila S.P.A. v. Kitchen, 219 USPQ 40 (S.D. 
Fla. 1982) and the cases cited therein. 
109 [d. 
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Enforcement of injunctions is by contempt proceedings brought in any district court in 
whose jurisdiction the defendant can be found .110 Enforcement of a judgment depends 
upon the existence of assets of the judgment debtor in the district where the court making 
the award sits or in the districts in which it is subsequently registered. Assets of a 
judgment debtor located abroad may be executed abroad by registration or by a separate 
action on the judgment by a local court. However, whether or not a judgment will be 
recognized and enforced in a foreign country depends upon the law of the particular 
country involved. 111 
Despite the imposing array of remedies available under the Lanham Act, the Act is 
regarded as largely ineffectual against modern, large scale counterfeitersY2 Some of its 
technical problems include its overbroad coverage with respect to all kinds of trademark 
infringement and counterfeiting actions, judicial reluctance to impose the seemingly 
harsh remedies under the Act,113 and its over-reliance on jurisdictional boundaries within 
the United States and abroad. Although counterfeiting, because of its inherent willful-
ness, is a prime candidate for treble damages and the award of attorneys' fees as 
remedies,114 such judgments are often impossible to enforce115 and damages are ex-
tremely difficult to measure.116 Injunctions against the professional counterfeiter are 
sometimes ignored ll7 as their counterfeit inventories are simply moved to a new jurisdic-
tion. When the rarely granted TROsl18 are issued to prevent the movement of suspected 
counterfeit goods, they are often ignored or circumvented. I 19 Even if a judge does grant a 
TRO, finding a marshal to enforce it and seize the named goods is sometimes next to 
impossible due to staff shortages and budget limitations.12o In some areas, appointments 
for seizure must be made up to one week in advance. By that time the goods have been 
moved or sold. 121 
Probably the most serious barrier to the efficacy of the Lanham Act is that it places 
the burden of tracking down the counterfeiters, building a case against them, and 
establishing the case in court exclusively on the victims of counterfeiting.122 Cartier, for 
example, spends over one million dollars annually on private investigators and lawyers to 
locate and sue counterfeiters of Cartier watches. 123 In contrast, no one supposes that since 
lIO 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1976). It should also be noted that there are no charges brought for 
criminal contempt. Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 67. 
III USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 8. 
m Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 157. 
lI3 Id. 
lI4 USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 9. 
lI5 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 159. 
lI6 It is difficult to assess "the defendant's profits" when he keeps no financial records, or 
destroys them; it is also difficult to assess "treble damages" when it is incalculable as to how many 
counterfeits were sold, and over what time period they were sold. 
lI7 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 66. 
liB There is some judicial reluctance towards granting TROs. Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, 
at 61. 
lI9 Id. at 66. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 63. It should also be noted that the goods do not have to be physically moved; the 
infringing trademarks, all equipment used to place the trademarks on the goods, the labels bearing 
the trademarks, and any percentage of the goods with the trademarks need only be moved. These 
items can fit into a large truck at an hour's notice, even in a large scale operation. 
122 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 158. 
123 The History of Cartier v. Counterfeiting, Cartier Press Release (available for public distribution 
through Cartier's general counsel). 
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banking institutions are prosperous, bank robbery and embezzlement should be left to 
those bankers able to bring lawsuits against the culprits. Many times it is a small company 
that is the victim of counterfeiting.124 Such companies are without the resources to pursue 
criminals across the globe as they flee from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Even the largest 
corporations are at a financial disadvantage against a large, disciplined, and secretive 
international counterfeiting organization.125 
Two recent cases illustrate the problems a plaintiff may have bringing suit under the 
Lanham Act. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co. ,126 the plaintiffs established 
without dispute l27 that the defendant had engaged in widespread counterfeiting of the 
plaintiffs' trademarked jeans, having sold at least 20,000 pairs in southern California 
alone. Nonetheless, while finding there had been infringement under the Lanham Act, 
the district court refused to award plaintiffs treble damages and attorneys' fees, and 
denied them lost profits. Rather, the judge ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff a 
five percent royalty on the approximately 20,000 pairs of jeans sold, in effect making the 
counterfeiter a licensee of the plaintiff. The total award amounted to only $12,750. In 
Textron, Inc. v. Aviation Sales, Inc. ,128 litigation arising out of the counterfeiting of Bell 
Helicopter parts,129 the plaintiff Textron was eventually awarded a judgment of 
$42,247,632. Unfortunately, the defendant corporation was bankrupt and the principal 
behind the scheme had fled to Europe. Textron was able to recover only a small portion 
of the judgment.13o 
2. Relief through the U.S. Customs Service 
In addition to an action for trademark infringement, the trademark owner may 
record his registered trademark with the U.S. Customs Service, which will then prohibit 
entry of goods bearing infringing marks. Similar provisions appear in the Lanham Act l31 
and the Tariff Act of 1930.132 The Lanham Act provision provides, inter alia, that "no 
article of imported merchandise ... which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in 
accordance with the provisions of [the Act] ... shall be admitted to entry at any custom 
house of the United States .... "133 The Tariff Act provides that "it shall be unlawful to 
import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchan-
dise ... bears a [registered] trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or 
association created or organized within, the United States."134 Although these two provi-
124 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 158. 
125Id. 
126 No. 81 Civ. 0603-R (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
127 The only witness who testified for the defendant was effectively limited to giving his name 
and other background particulars because he invoked the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in response to most substantive questions at his prior depositions. Rakoff and Wolff, 
supra note 4, at 158. 
128 No. 77 Civ. 1317 (C.D. Cal. 1980). 
129 According to Bell Helicopter Company officials, millions of dollars worth of substandard 
counterfeit "Sikorsky" and "Bell Helicopter" parts have been sold to NATO allies and American 
helicopter fleets. These parts, including transmissions and landing gear assemblies, are believed to 
have been installed in over 600 helicopters in the military fleets of Britain, West Germany, France, 
Belgium, and at least five other American allies, causing a number of fatal accidents. 
130 Fuquay, Bogus Parts Judgment Favors Bell, Fort Worth Star Telegram, Oct. 2, 1980, at Bl. 
131 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1976). 
132 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1976). 
133 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1976). 
134 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1976). 
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sions appear to be identical in scope, there are vast discrepancies between the jurisdic-
tional effects of the two Acts.135 The cost of recording is minimal: $190 for each trade-
mark and class of trademark registration and 1,000 copies of the registration certificate, 
plus a status copy of the registration certificate .136 However, this procedure is not available 
for all types of intellectual property, including common law trademarks and "parallel 
importations," where products manufactured by the trademark owner or his licensees for 
sale in other countries are imported into the United States.137 
After the registration process, the Customs procedures used to deny entry to coun-
terfeit or confusing marks degenerate into confusion. Although all goods bearing either a 
recorded trademark or a mark likely to be confused with the recorded trademark are 
subject to seizure,138 the rules provide for different treatment of "counterfeit marks" and 
those which are merely likely to be confused.139 A "counterfeit" mark is defined as a mark 
which is identical or substantially identical to the registered mark,140 and a "confusing" 
mark is one that would cause confusion to an unsophisticated buyer of the product at the 
retail leveJ.l41 If the imported goods bear a counterfeit mark, Customs will notify the 
trademark owner of the seizure and the owner has thirty days to decide whether to 
consent to importation of the goods, exportation, entry after obliteration of the mark, or 
other appropriate disposition.142 However, if the mark is only a confusing mark, the 
goods will be released if the confusing mark is removed or obliterated in such a manner 
that it is illegible and incapable of being reconstructed or reconstituted into a confusing 
mark.143 Goods imported for the owner's "personal use" are also exempted from the 
seizure requirements only if the owner imports only one article.144 All of these rather 
confusing distinctions do not ensure an efficient system.145 
Customs recordation procedures only apply to registered trademarks and to copy-
rights. Therefore, corporations with other types of intellectual property problems such as 
alleged patent or common law trademark infringement have a choice as to whether they 
will file a Section 337 action under the Tariff Act of 1930146 at the U.S. International 
[35 19 U.S.C. § 1526 is limited to protecting U.S. citizens and firms; 15 U.S.C. § 1124 extends to 
foreign firms as well. The Customs Service embraces both statutes in its implementing regulations. 19 
C.F.R. Part 133. Customs' implementing regulations also cover foreign and domestic commercial 
names not registered as trademarks, which are protected by 19 U.S.C. § 1526, but do not refer to 
false designations or origin, which are mentioned in 15 U.S.C. § 1124 but not in 19 U.S.C. § 1526. 
[36 The rule requires 1,000 copies. According to U.S. Customs officials in Boston, in actual 
practice Customs only requires five copies. 
[37 19 C.F.R. § 133.22(c)(3). Recently though, two courts have found that parallel importations 
constituted trademark infringement, Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho Int. Ca. No. 82-5695 (9th 
Cir. 1983) and Bell & Howell; Mamiya v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F.Supp. 1063 (E.D. N.Y. 1982), rev'd 
on other grounds, vacated and remanded, Dkt. No. 82-7867 (2d Cir. 1983), and Customs is reportedly 
considering changing its regulations to cover parallel importation. BNA INT. INCE., 1 TRADE U.S.A. 
(Sept. 1983). 
[38 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a). 
[39 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b), (d), § 133.23(b)(3). 
[40 15 U.S.C. § 1127; 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(a). 
[4[ There is great controversy surrounding this test. Indeed, the Second Circuit in Montres 
Rolex SA v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1594 (1984), affirmed the granting of a writ 
of mandamus by the lower court directing Customs to use the ordinary consumer test. 
[42 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e); 19 C.F.R. § 133.23a(c). 
[43 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(4). 
[44 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(7), § 148.55. 
[45 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 162. 
[46 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976). 
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Trade Commission or a federal district court action under the Lanham Act. Corporations 
frequently choose Section 337 because it is an avenue of relief in addition to other 
provisions of law, 147 and Commission actions are generally decided within one year (or 
eighteen months, in more complicated cases).148 Section 337 cases also do not raise the 
jurisdictional problems and enforcement of judgment problems that exist where foreign 
entities are involved. If a violation is found, the Commission may issue in rem orders 
excluding the infringing products from the United States.149 Similarly, enforcement is not 
diffiCult since Customs enforces all exclusion orders,150 and the exclusion order may 
exclude all infringing products whether or not made by the foreign firms named in the 
SUit. 151 
To prove a Section 337 violation, complainants must show that respondents have 
engaged in unfair acts and unfair methods of competition in the importation of articles 
into the United States, or in their sale by either the owner or importer, or consignee or 
agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to substantially i~ure or destroy an 
industry which is efficiently and economically operated within the United States. The first 
element, "unfair acts and unfair methods of competition," encompasses a variety of 
causes of action, including patent, common law, or registered trademark infringement, 
misappropriation of trade dress, misappropriation of trade secrets, false designation of 
source or origin, false representation, passing off, false advertising, and tortious interfer-
ence with contractual relations. 152 This means that the scope oflitigation is broader under 
Section 337 than the normal Customs relief accorded under Customs exclusion proce-
dures for registered trademarks. The second element, involving the "importation into the 
United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee or agent or either ... ",153 
is proven as long as the articles are in the stream of domestic U.S. commerce.154 The third 
element is jurisdictional; a domestic industry must file the complaint. The Commission 
decides on a case-by-case basis how much and what types of activity in the United States 
are necessary to support a domestic industry finding. 155 In addition, the complainant must 
prove that the domestic industry is "efficiently operated,"156 although the Commission has 
always found this criteria satisfied.157 The fourth element, an "effect to destroy or 
substantially injure the domestic industry," is viewed from a dual perspective; the substan-
tial injury test relates to existing effects whereas the tendency to injure relates to future 
effects.15s A factor generally considered under this element is the effect importation has 
or would have on the complainant's production, inventory, sales, profitability, employ-
ment, and prices.159 Commission complaints are also not subject to the Federal Rules of 
147 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976). 
148 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(I) (1976). 
149 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1976). 
150 19 C.F.R. § 1240. 
151 USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 15. 
152 [d. at 16. 
153 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976). 
154 Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29, at II (1979). 
155 Miniature, Battery-Operated, All Terrain, Wheeled Vehicles, Inv. No. 337-TA-122 (1983). 
158 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976). 
157 USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 16. 
158 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976). 
15. See, e.g., Sneakers with Fabric Uppers and Rubber Soles, Inv. No. 337-TA-II8 (1983); Drill 
Point Screws for Drywall Construction, Inv. No. 337-TA-II6 (1983); Miniature Plug-In Blade Fuses, 
Inv. No. 337-TA-II4 (1982). 
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Civil Procedure and are generally longer in length than district court complaints.16o 
There are two types of remedies available to the Commission: exclusion orders and 
cease and desist orders. An exclusion order may be either a general exclusion order 
directing the Customs Service to exclude the infringing products of any firm or a limited 
exclusion order requiring the Customs Service to prohibit entry of the infringing prod-
ucts made by a specific firm or firms. To obtain a general exclusion order, the Commission 
requires complainants to show "both a widespread pattern of unauthorized use" of the 
infringing productl61 and "business conditions" which could indicate "foreign manufac-
turers other than the respondents to the investigation may enter the market with infring-
ing products."162 Limited exclusion orders have been ordered in two cases where it was 
believed Customs would find it difficult to decide whether a particular product infringed 
a patent or when a general exclusion order might unduly interfere with foreign trade.163 
Cease and desist orders can be issued if the Commission has personal jurisdiction over the 
respondent. 164 Cease and desist orders have generally been issued against domestic 
respondents' unlawful acts which occur within the United States. 
Even if the Commission finds that a remedy is appropriate, it must still consider 
certain public interest factors in determining whether relief should be granted.16s The 
Commission has found that public interest concerns have outweighed the need for relief 
in two recent cases. One case involved the the Ford Motor Company's need for a key 
component to improve the fuel economy of its cars in order to meet the public's need for 
energy efficient cars.166 The other case involved the need for basic research equipment in 
the field of structural nuclear physics.167 Limited Presidential veto review was introduced 
into the process by the Trade Act of 1974168 and three vetoes have occurred since.169 
Despite these extensive provisions and the relative easing of jurisdictional questions 
compared to the Lanham Act, Customs has been ineffective in stopping the tide of 
counterfeits entering the United States. Many counterfeiters circumvent the process by 
not placing infringing marks on goods until after they have cleared Customs. 170 A 
160 For example, the Commission rules require a statement of the facts constituting the alleged 
unfair methods of competition and unfair acts. 19 C.F.R. § 210.20(a)(2). 
161 Airless Paint Spray Pumps, Inv. No. 337-TA-90, at 18, 216 USPQ 465 (1981). 
162 [d. 
163 [d. at 17. See also Certain Headboxes and Papermaking Machine Forming Sections for the 
Continuous Production of Paper and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-82A, 213 USPQ 291 
(1981). 
164 Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, Inv. No. 337-T A-69 (1981). However, in personam jurisdic-
tion is not necessary for the enforcement of a cease and desist order by means of exclusion of articles. 
Certain Large Video Matrix Display Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-T A-75, at 30 n. 
10, 213 USPQ 475 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, SSIH Equipment Co. v. USITC, 673 F.2d 1387 
(CCPA 1982). 
165 See comments from the Trade Act of 1974: Senate Committee Reports on the 1974 Amendments, S. 
Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 197 (1974), for an indication of Congressional attitudes. 
166 Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, at 17-21,205 USPQ 71 (1979). 
167 Inclined Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-67, at 22-31 
( 1980). 
168 5 U.S.C. §§ 5312, 5314-16 (1976). 
169 One case involved a jurisdictional dispute as to whether the Commission should consider 
predatory pricing at the same time that a dumping case was pending. Certain Welded Stainless Steel 
Pipe and Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29 (1979). The Presidential disapproval in Pipe and Tube is found at 
43 F.R. 17789, Apr. 26, 1978. The other two vetoes were for policy reasons. See 46 F .R. 32361, June 
22, 1981,47 F.R. 29919, June 28, 1982. 
170 "[As an example] the blank jeans were manufactured overseas or in the United States and 
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judgment for damages is not possible through the Commission's procedures, leaving the 
economic damage done to legitimate manufacturers unrecompensed. 171 In addition, the 
process described above is not uniformly enforced at all points of entry into the United 
States. l72 Overall, however, the weakest link in the Customs Service barrier against 
counterfeiting is that the only penalty for attempting to import pirated goods is the 
confiscation of the goods themselves. Such an action often amounts to no more than an 
expense in doing business for the counterfeiter, not an end to his business altogether. 173 
3. Other Civil Remedies 
Besides the administrative civil remedies available through the Customs Service, 
relief is available at the federal level through the Federal Trade Commission Act. 174 The 
problem with this type of relief, however, is that the powers of the Federal Trade 
Commission in this area are primarily injunctive and, in any event, have rarely been 
invoked against trademark infringement of any kind, let alone counterfeiting. 175 At the 
state level the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act is another possible 
civil remedy. Variations of this Act have been adopted in a number of states, but its 
penalties are, for the most part, insubstantial. 176 New York State, for example, had 
adopted a version of the Act 177 which provides for "treble damages" but only up to a 
maximum of one thousand doliars.17s These state laws also provide little challenge for the 
international counterfeiter, who can jump from jurisdiction to jurisdiction like a knight 
on a chessboard or can find a "front" to conduct business for him. 
Private civil remedies at the state level include variations of the Model State Trade-
mark Bill l79 and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("UDTPA"). 180 The majority 
of the states have adopted the Model State Trademark Bill as their state trademark law. 
Originally prepared in 1949 by the United States Trademark Association,18I it does not 
vary significantly from the provisions of the Lanham Act. IS2 The UDTPA, approved in 
1964 and 1966 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws/s3 
delivered to the counterfeiter. Computerized sewing machines then imitated the distinctive stitching 
on the pockets. False buttons with the manufacturer's logo were sewn into place and spurious labels 
were then attached to the garment. At the location in Staten Island, approximately one-half million 
labels were recovered. These labels were manufactured in the United States." Hearings on S. 875, 
supra note 10, at 59 (testimony of Arthur Katz, Captain, New York City Police Department, Com-
mander of the Safe, Loft, and Truck Squad, Detective Division, New York Police Department). 
171 USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 22. 
172Id. at 21. If the various ports of entry are not uniformly imposing restrictions against the 
importation of trademarked goods, the domestic owner of the trademark may request a ruling from 
customs headquarters regarding the appropriate restriction. The ruling will then serve as a guide for 
all Customs' ports of entry. C.S.D. 81-197, 15 CUSTOMS BULLETIN 1120 (1981). 
173 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 162. 
174 IS U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1976). 
175 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICES § 1.03(b) (1980). 
176 Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724 (1972); 89 A.L.R. 3D 399 
(1979). 
177 N.Y. GEN. BUSINESS LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 1980). 
178 Id. at 349(h). 
179 MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL (1964). 
180 UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1966). 
181 J. GILSON, supra note 175, at § 10.03. 
182 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 161. 
183 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is an organization of 
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has been adopted by sixteen states and contains no provisions for trademark registra-
tion. 184 The Act essentially codifies the common law of unfair competition, making 
actionable the commission of a deceptive trade practice. l85 Injunctions can be granted 
without proof of monetary damage, loss of profits, or any intent to deceive, but the 
all-important search and seizure orders cannot. 186 Therefore, the effectiveness of the 
Model State Trademark Act and the UDTP A is theoretically as limited as the provisions 
of the Lanham Act. They are even more limited in terms of the actual resources the states 
can use against the counterfeiters. 
B. Criminal Statutes 
Until the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 in October 1984, 
no federal criminal statute directly addressed the general problem of commercial trade-
mark counterfeiting. 187 A number of statutes, however, dealt with the counterfeiting of 
specific goods. These included the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act l88 which makes it a crime 
to counterfeit food, drugs, or cosmetics with the intent to defraud, and the recently 
enacted Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982 189 which makes record and 
tape piracy a criminal offense. The impact of these specifically tailored counterfeiting 
statutes has been negligible given the increasing volume of counterfeiting in pharmaceut-
ical, video, and audio products. It is unclear whether the newly enacted anti-trademark 
counterfeiting provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 will fare any 
better. 
1. The History of Penal Sanctions for Counterfeiting 
Ancient penalties for commercial counterfeiting were draconian, to say the least. In 
the fourteenth century, for example, the Elector of Palatine decided the sale of spurious 
wine was an outrageous form of deceit and ordered the seller hanged. 190 An edict issued 
by Charles V in 1544 proclaimed the penalty for infringing Flemish Tapestry marks was 
amputation of the seller's right hand. 191 A royal edict from Charles IX of France in 1564 
state officials formed in 1892 to promote uniformity in state laws. Commissioners are appointed by 
the governor or legislature of a state and serve without compensation. Francis, 1961 National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 25 Ky. S.B.]. 201 (1961). 
184 ]. GILSON, supra note 175, at § 1.04(2)(a). 
185 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 161. 
188 UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, supra note 180, at § 2(a)(1). It should also be 
noted that damages are not available under the UDTPA. Dole, The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act: Another Step Towards a National Law of Unfair Trade Practices, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1005, 1017 (1967). 
187 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 164. Beside the Acts mentioned in the text, counterfeiting 
is theoretically actionable under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making false statements to agency of federal 
government); 49 U.S.C. § 121 (making false statements on a bill of lading); 18 U.S.C. § 542 (making 
false statements in connection with the importation of goods from foreign commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 
1341 (the mail fraud statute); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (the wire fraud statute); and 15 U.S.C §§ 1701-20 (the 
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act) but, according to William C. Steffin, an attorney with the 
Los Angeles law firm of Lyon & Lyon, "there has never been a successful prosecution of a trademark 
counterfeiter under applicable federal statutes based solely on the trademark counterfeiting ac-
tivities." Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 65. 
188 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1976). 
189 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (1976). 
190 Conlon, supra note 21, at 281, cited in Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 152. 
191 1d. at 281. 
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mandated the death penalty for commercial counterfeiters. 192 In 1666, the drapers of 
Carcassone were protected by a statute ordering infringers sentenced to the pillory. 193 By 
the nineteenth century, these penalties were replaced in virtually every European country 
with a modern system of fines and imprisonments for those found guilty of counterfeit-
ing. 194 This system remains in place today. 195 
Although the first consideration of the need for a federal trademark statute occurred 
in 1791,t96 no federal act was passed until the Trademark Act of 1870,197 misleadingly 
entitled "An Act to Revise, Consolidate and Amend the Statutes Relating to Patents and 
Copyrights."198 The Act afforded the exclusive right to use marks registered under its 
provisions and provided for damages and injunctive relief as remedies for counterfeiting 
and similar infringement. 199 There was no provision for federal criminal sanctions under 
the Act and Congress quickly realized they had made a mistake by the omission. As 
economic growth exploded in the post-Civil War era and the dependence on trademarks 
grew, there was also an unprecedented increase in trademark fraud and financial chican-
ery of every kind. Local and state authorities, overwhelmed with the problem, appealed to 
Congress and the Trademark Act of 1870 was amended in 1876 with "An Act to Punish 
the Counterfeiting of Trade-mark Goods."200 
This criminalization of the knowing use of counterfeit trademarks only lasted three 
years. In 1879, the Supreme Court invalidated the entire federal Trademark Act of 
1870201 on the ground that it was improperly based on Congress' power over copyrights 
and patents, rather than Congress' power over interstate commerce. The invalidation of 
the 1870 Act also invalidated the 1876 criminal amendments. Congress has been in no 
hurry to repair the breach. In 1899, in his classic work on international patent and 
trademark laws, prominent legal scholar Arthur P. Greeley noted that among the major 
commercial nations affording exclusive use trademark protection, only the United States 
had no national law providing criminal penalties for trademark counterfeiting. 202 
2. The Trademark Counterfeiting Acts of 1982 and 1983 
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1982 was originally introduced in the U.S. 
Senate203 during the 97th Congress, by Senator Charles Mathias (R-Md.), Chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Law. An identical version of the bill204 was 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 GREELEY, FOREIGN PATENT AND TRADEMARK LAWS 179 (1899). 
195 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 152. 
196 A petition was submitted to Congress in 1791 by Samuel Breck and other Boston sailmakers, 
requesting the exclusive privilege of using particular marks for identifying their sailcloth. The 
petition was referred to then Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson who urged passage of a federal law 
based on the commerce clause, providing for the registration of trademarks and for criminal 
penalties for their infringement. Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 153 (Jefferson's comments are 
reprinted therein). 
197 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12 (1870). 
1~8 Id. 
199 Id. at 79. 
200 Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141 (1876). 
201 Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
202 GREELEY, supra note 194, at 179. 
203 Designated S. 2428. 
204 Designated H.R. 6175. 
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introduced in the House by Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino (D-N.J.). The 
bill provided for stern criminal sanctions and civil penalties205 beyond that of the Lanham 
Act and a simplification of judicial procedures, especially with respect to obtaining ex parte 
seizure orders.206 Opposed by the Reagan Administration, the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, and the United States Trademark Association,207 both bills died in committee with 
the 97th Congress. 
The same Act, with certain technical modifications,208 was introduced in the U.S. 
Senate209 and the House21O during the first session of the 98th Congress by Senator 
Mathias and Chairman Rodino. After some political maneuvering prompted by election 
year promises to get tough on crime, the bill was incorporated into the sweeping Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984211 and was signed into law in October, 1984. 
This legislation amends Title 18 of the United States Code by adding section 2320, 
which provides that anyone who knowingly traffics or attempts to traffic in a counterfeit 
mark in -foreign or domestic commerce shall, if an individual, be fined not more than 
$250,000 and/or imprisoned for up to five years, and, if a corporation, be fined not more 
than $1 million. 212 The Act covers only marks registered on the Principal Register or 
otherwise protected by statute. The owner of the infringed mark may bring a civil action 
in the U.S. district court to obtain injunctive relief and recover treble damages or profits, 
and costs, including attorneys' fees.2I3 Prejudgment interest on actual damages may be 
awarded at the discretion of the court. 214 In such a civil action, a final judgment or decree 
rendered in favor of the United States in the criminal proceeding would estop the 
defendant from denying the essential allegations of the civil offense. 215 The court may 
ultimately order the destruction of the counterfeit materials taken into evidence,216 and, 
in the Act's most controversial provision, ex parte search and seizure orders can be 
authorized for both criminal and civil actions. 217 
Lobbying for and against both the 1982 and 1983 Acts was furious and neatly split, 
with few exceptions, along industrial function lines. Support for the bill was led by the 
International Anticounterfeiting Coalition,218 an organization entirely composed of 
205 For an individual, the penalties are a fine of not more than $250,000, and a sentence of not 
more than five years. For a corporation, the penalty is a fine of not more than $1 million. 
206 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 60-64. (Testimony of William Steffin, qualified supra note 
187, as to confusion of present status of ex parte seizure order availability). 
207 See the testimony of William Baxter and Thomas J. Corum for representative positions on 
the bills. Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 8 and 72, respectively. 
208 A comparison of the 1983 Act with the 1982 Act reveals a narrowing of the intent standard 
(scienter), a simplification of the definition of "counterfeit," elimination of a choice in the type of 
damages a court can provide, and a greater reliance on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
guidance in the area of TROs and ex parte seizure orders. 
209 Designated S. 875. 
210 Designated H.R. 2447. 
211 House Joint Resolution 473 (1984) P.L. 98-473. 
212 Section (a). 
213 Section (d)(1). 
214 Section (d)(2). 
215 Section (d)(3). 
216 Section (f). 
217 Section (e). 
218 Formed in 1978, the International Anti-Counterfeiting coalition consists of more than 70 
major manufacturers who seek to combat commercial counterfeiting through cooperation with law 
enforcement and consumer protection groups. The Coalition's own law firm, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie 
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product manufacturers,219 while opposition was left to various retailers' associations, such 
as the Association of General Merchandise Chains, Inc. 220 and other retailing chains, 
notably the K-Mart corporation. 221 The Reagan Administration supported the Act in 
principle but only after more unspecified technical modification. 222 
The ultimate question that bogged down both the 1982 and 1983 Acts for so long was 
who should have the burden of stopping counterfeiting, retailers who sell the merchan-
dise or the manufacturers who produced it. It appears the manufacturers have won this 
battle. The dispute over who should carry the burden is inherent to legislation on this 
issue, and will remain a stumbling block to efficient enforcement until both sides are given 
an equal share of the burden. A brief synopsis of both positions follows. 
a. The Manufacturers' Position (for the Act) 
1. Antitrust legislation binds the hands of manufacturers to act 
Since the passage' of the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,223 the U.S. Department of 
Justice has taken a strict position against the practice of retail (sometimes called resale) 
price maintenance. 224 This Act, not designed to help the consumer but actually to protect 
small businesses from larger competitors,225 has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 226 to make retail price maintenance schemes 
per se anti-competitive. 227 This poses a dilemma, however, for the manufacturer wishing to 
trace the path of counterfeit goods. Extensive identification, tracking, and marking 
systems now exist for use by manufacturers. 228 Although these systems could be used to 
follow the trail of legitimate merchandise through the stream of commerce and could 
thereby easily identify those retailers selling counterfeit goods, such a tracing scheme 
would (or could) be judged as a non-price vertical arrangement under the per se rule in 
Sylvania and its progeny, subjecting the manufacturer to antitrust penalties. Easing the per 
se rule would certainly decrease market competition and raise prices. 229 Failure to ease the 
& Alexander, participated heavily in the drafting of the Model Commercial Counterfeiting Act, a 
precursor to the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1982. 
219 A list of members can be found in Hearings on S. 875, supra note 10 at 53. 
220 Hearings on S. 875, supra note 10, at 24-33. 
221 According to James L. Bikoff, President and Executive Director of the International Anti-
Counterfeiting Coalition, the intensity of objection coming from the Association of General Mer-
chandise Chains and the K-Mart Corporation bordered on "paranoia." Hearings on S. 875, supra note 
10, at 49. 
222 Letter from Hamilton Fish,Jr., member of the Congress of the United States, Apr. 9,1984 
(written to author). 
223 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13(a), 13(b), 21(a) (1976). 
224 Retail price maintenance is a practice whereby a manufacturer sets the minimum retail price 
of a product, thereby eliminating price competition among retailers of that product. 
225 P. WONNACOTT & T. WONNACOTT, ECONOMICS 503 (1979). 
226 433 U.S. 36 (1977), on remand Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 461 F.Supp. 1046 
(N.D. Cal. 1978), afI'd Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 694 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
227 This per se approach has been subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4821 (1984); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo 
Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4341 (1984); 30 A.L.R. FED. 19, Supp. § 1. 
226 For a comprehensive listing and explanation of sophisticated marking, tracking, and iden-
tification technologies currently available, see USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 59-61. 
229 Such is the justification for the per se rule in the first place; see Sylvania, supra note 226, at 
38-40. 
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rule means manufacturers will be advised by their attorneys not to trace their goods. 230 
Certain pro-retailer factions in this debate have argued that the Act is a thinly veiled 
attempt by brand-name manufacturers to engage in retail price maintenance. This, of 
course, is denied. 231 
11. The seizure provision of the Act is necessary and safeguarded 
Without a seizure provision obtained ex parte, counterfeiters will simply move their 
goods when alerted that the authorities are aware of them. 232 The pending bills contain 
significant disincentives directed toward unscrupulous manufacturers who would disrupt 
the legitimate business of retailers. These disincentives include the posting of a substantial 
bond to cover potential damages to the party from whom the goods are seized. Where the 
seizing party proceeds without adequate evidence that the goods are counterfeit, the 
defendant would be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees. 233 The ex parte seizure 
provision of the Act is supported by the Reagan Administration. 234 
111. The Act is necessary 
The increasing scope, range, and volume of counterfeit goods entering and being 
sold in the United States each year is offered as prima facie evidence that current laws are 
not working and that additional legislation is required. 
b. The Retailers' Position (against the Act) 
1. The Act is unnecessary 
As support for their position that the Act is unnecessary, opponents point to the 
increasing number of actions brought under the Lanham Act,235 the redundancy of the 
civil and criminal sanctions in the Act versus those already existing under the Lanham Act 
and various U.S. Customs regulations,236 the increasing availability of seizure orders (not 
necessarily ex parte) made possible by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in In 
Re Matter of Vuitton Et. Fils,237 and the liberal discovery permitted under Rule 65 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to facilitate the identification of counterfeiters. 238 In any 
case, some argue that trademark infringement is essentially a private wrong committed 
230 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 10. (Testimony of William Baxter). 
231 Hearings on S. 875, supra note 10, at 49-51. (Testimony of James Bikoff). 
232 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 159-60. 
233 Hearings on S. 875, supra note 10, at 51. 
234 Hearings on S. 875, supra note 10, at 13. The bill is also supported by the U.S. Departments of 
Commerce and Justice. [d. at 13. 
235 Hearings on S. 875, supra note 10, at 26. 
236 [d. at 101. 
237 606 F.2d 1 (2d ciT. 1979). In the controversial Vuitton case, the Lanham Act was stretched to 
the limit as the Second Circuit recognized that in appropriate circumstances a district court may 
grant ex parte applications of trademark owners for the issuance of temporary restraining orders 
prohibiting counterfeiters from disposing of their goods. Of course, this decision is only followed in 
district courts within the Second Circuit (denying this remedy to all other victims) and it is unclear 
under what circumstances the ex parte TRO can be granted. (The Vuitton case dealt with a counterfei-
ter who transferred goods on learning of an imminent injunction to a third party.) See Hearings on S. 
875, supra note 10, at 38-40. 
23. Rule 65 deals with temporary restraining orders in the status quo. 
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against a trademark owner and, on the spectrum "of unlawful actions, trademark infringe-
ment does not rise to the level of reprehensibility as to justify granting private litigants 
the right to obtain ex parte seizure orders."239 
11. Ex parte seizure orders should be restrained or eliminated 
Retailers fear that they will become the target of vicious manufacturers, their inven-
tories seized without notice, and their goodwill and sales obliterated by the bad publicity 
which would follow ex parte seizure.24O The safeguards advocated by supporters of the bill 
- the posting of a surety bond and the possible attorney fee compensation - appear to 
be inadequate. They argue that the goodwill lost in a media-covered seizure of a legiti-
mate retailer's inventory could be worth many times the value of the inventory seized or 
the expended attorneys' fees. 241 They also note that the Senate version of the bill242 does 
not require the posting of a bond nor are punitive damages available in situations where 
complainants use bad faith in seeking the seizure. 243 
lll. The wording of the Act is overbroad and vague 
An illustration of the retailers' argument that the wording of the Act is overbroad 
and vague is the wording of the definition of counterfeiting. For example, the wording of 
counterfeiting definitions within the Act would also seem to apply to trade practices not 
considered counterfeiting per se, such as simple infringement, trade dress, knock-offs, 
and grey market sales, which can sometimes be considered beneficial to the public.244 
Similar objections surround the Act's definition of "traffic" and "trademark."245 These 
wording problems prevent full Reagan Administration support for the bills.246 
The passage of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1983 is not a guarantee of 
success against counterfeiters, but it appears to be a step in the right direction. The ex 
parte seizure provisions are a weapon long desired by anti-counterfeiters but their real 
impact is unclear after the liberalization of the Lanham Act expressed by the Second 
Circuit in the Vuitton decision. The passage of this Act reeks of election year politics and it 
is currently unknown whether the will to enforce this legislation exists, especially since 
many of the same enforcement agencies charged with keeping counterfeits off our streets 
are now burdened with the more politically popular "war against drugs." One hundred 
and five years after the end of penal sanctions for commercial trademark counterfeiting, 
239 Hearings on S. 875, supra note 10, at 104. See note 3, supra, for terminology definitions. 
240 [d. at 27-29. 
241 [d. 
242 This is also true of the House version, but the House has not yet conducted hearings on the 
bill. 
243 Considering the intense fears many retailers have towards ex-parte seizures by disgruntled 
manufacturers, the lack of a more substantive bond or punitive damages provision illustrates the 
political weakness of the retailer's position on the issue of counterfeiting in general. It should be 
noted that neither the Model Commercial Counterfeiting Act nor the Trademark Counterfeiting Act 
of 1982 had such a restraining provision on ex-parte seizures by manufacturers. This is no surprise 
since this bill was essentially drafted by the law firm representing the international anti-
counterfeiting coalition. See note 218, supra. 
244 Hearings on S. 875, supra note 10, at 29. 
245 [d. 
246 [d. at 29-31. 
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Congress has finally agreed to reimpose them.247 Now it is up to the executive branch to 
enforce them. 
3. State Criminal Statutes 
A number of states have criminal statutes pertammg to counterfeiting but few 
prosecutions are brought under them. 248 In general, these statutes249 require the prosecu-
tion to prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First it must be shown that the 
mark is cove.red by the statute. 250 Second, someone other than the defendant must have 
the exclusive use of that mark.251 The third element requires the commission of some act 
that will serve as the actus reus, such as counterfeiting the mark, affixing it to a spurious 
good, or vending the goods with a counterfeit mark attached. 252 Finally, in most of the 
statutes or case law interpreting them, there must be an intent to defraud (scienter). 253 
While these statutes appear to directly address trademark counterfeiting, most make 
the crime a misdemeanor and impose a prison sentence of only a few months.254 More-
over, since these maximum penalties, like other maximum prison sentences, are rarely 
imposed, the penalty is really only the threat of a small fine. 255 Even if the statutes were 
made tougher by the legislatures, criminal law enforcement statistics from the past would 
suggest that local police authorities, with their limited resources, limited jurisdictional 
authority, and more pressing immediate demands on their time, would not fare well 
against the international, large-scale, ultrasophisticated counterfeiter. 256 
In addition to the laws mentioned above, counterfeiting would theoretically be 
actionable under the general criminal statutes for fraud and larceny. In fact, for the 
above-mentioned reasons, there are very few prosecutions brought under these stat-
utes. 257 
4. The Need for Tough Criminal Penalties 
There is little deterrence in the civil sanctions of the Lanham Act or the other 
administrative remedies available at the federal level. 258 In an industry where huge profit 
margins are available for the unscrupulous, fines and judgments are considered a cost of 
247 For an indignant article on the subject of federal delays in passing penal legislation, see 
Rakoff, For Passage Now of the Trademark Counteifeiting Act: 104 Years is Long Enough to Wait, 73 
TRADEMARK REP. 553 (1983). 
248 89 A.L.R. 3D 399 (1979)(indicating that the shortage of commercial counterfeiting case law is 
due to the relative newness of many statutes and a shortage of prosecutions). 
249 See Harrison, Penal Actions for Trademark Infringement: A Survey of Statutes and Cases, 57 
TRADEMARK REP. 285, 290-99 (1967) (assessing state criminal statutes relating to counterfeiting.) 
256 Id. at 292. Many state statutes exclude service marks from protection and include collective or 
union marks. 
2.1 /d. at 293-94. 
252 Id. at 294-97. 
2.3 Id. at 297-98. 
254 Id. at 299-300. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 53-347(a) (West Supp. 1979) (imposes a' 
maximum fine of $500 and/or six months imprisonment in Connecticut.) 
255 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 163. 
256 Conlon, supra note 21, at 281. 
257 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 162. 
256 The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(I) (1976) is an administrative alterna-
tive, but since the powers of the FTC are purely injunctive, they have been only rarely used against 
trademark infringement of any kind, let alone counterfeiting. J. GILSON, supra note 175, at § 1.03(b). 
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doing business, much like other expenses. The existing state and local legislation impos-
ing criminal penalties cannot be expected to bear the burden of public attack against 
counterfeiting. In a problem so international and national in scope,259 the federal gov-
ernment must take an active role in prosecuting counterfeiters; time will tell if it will. The 
onus of prosecuting counterfeiters should remain with those profiting from their trade-
marks. Such firms will continue to pursue counterfeiters, especially under the new ex parte 
seizure provisions of the 1983 Act. Perhaps the federal role in prosecuting counterfeiters 
should be coordinated with private concerns, allowing federal resources to be targeted 
against the largest and most slippery counterfeiters while conventional civil actions attack 
the rest. In any case, those guilty of brand name piracy should be given the maximum 
penalties at the outset of federal enforcement for the highest deterrence effect possible. 
As William Steffin, an attorney with the Los Angeles patent law firm of Lyon & Lyon, has 
publicly stated "there is nothing like the [deterrence] of the clang of a cell door."26o 
IV. INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM 
Commercial trademark counterfeiting is truly an international problem. No indus-
trialized nation is safe from being considered a market for counterfeit goods and no 
developing, cash-poor nation is immune from the tempting appeal of giving open or tacit 
approval to the cash-generating activity of the trademark pirate. 261 International coopera-
tion is necessary to deny production sanctuaries, export and distribution systems, and 
markets to the counterfeiter. Predictably, given the current size and growth rates of 
trademark counterfeiting, these agreements have not been substantially effective in 
deterring the activity nor making it more difficult. 262 
A. International Agreements 
The major international agreements concerning exclusive trademark use and reme-
dies for infringement are outlined below, with a short synopsis of each and why it is 
generally considered a moribund solution to a growing problem. 
1. The International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property 
Established in 1883, The International Union for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty (also known as the The Paris Union) is subscribed to by about eighty nations263 
including the United States. 264 Three specific articles of the agreement apply directly to 
259 The problem is international in terms of the level of counterfeit exports and the common 
problems created in each market by the counterfeiter; the problem is national in terms of the scope, 
size, and sophistication of the domestic distribution systems within the United States, and for the 
deleterious impact counterfeiting has had on American industry and the welfare of the American 
consumer. 
260 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 67. 
261 Walker, supra note 7, at 121. 
26;' As an example of the growth of counterfeiting, the Ford Motor Company claims there has 
been a doubling of the counterfeiting of automobile parts within the last two years. Beach, supra note 
25, at B2. 
263 For a complete list of signatories, see OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, 
DEPT. OF STATE PUB. No. 9351, TREATIES IN FORCE (1983) [hereinafter cited as TREATIES IN FORCE]' 
264 The United States signed the treaty in 1911. It has been revised in 1900 (Brussels revision), 
1911 (Washington revision), 1925 (The Hague revision), 1934 (the London revision), 1958 (the 
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commercial counterfeiting: Article 6 prohibits the use and registration of confusing 
trademarks, Article 9 prohibits the importation of goods bearing unlawful trademarks 
and authorizes seizure of such goods where permitted by national law, and Article 10 
provides protection against unfair competitive measures. 265 The Paris Union does not 
require signatory nations to apply specific standards but requires only that they grant the 
same trademark protection to nationals of other signatory nations as they do to their own 
citizens. 266 Therefore, protection under the Paris Union is limited to the efficiency of each 
nation's trademark laws. The inadequacy of U.S. trademark counterfeiting laws, de-
scribed above, is typical of the members of the Union. 267 
The Paris Union is generally regarded as ineffective as a medium for targeting 
international pressure against counterfeiters. 268 Perhaps the best measure of the Union's 
impotence is that Taiwan, the most nefarious counterfeiting nation in the world, is not a 
party to the agreement. 269 
2. The Madrid Agreement for the International Registration of Marks 
The Madrid Agreement, in force since 1891,270 has been affirmed by twenty-four 
member nations, including the entire continent of Europe except for Poland, Greece, 
Bulgaria, Albania, and the four Scandinavian countries. 271 The most recent member to 
join is the Soviet Union, which signed the Agreement in July 1976.272 
The Madrid Agreement provides for the registration of marks at an International 
Bureau, part of the World Intellectual Property Organization, located in Geneva, Switzer-
land. Registrations effected under the agreement are called international as every regist-
ration has an effect in several countries, and potentially in all member States of the 
Madrid Union. To be able to enjoy the registration advantages of this agreement, the 
applicant must be a national of, domiciled in, or have a real and effective industrial or 
commercial establishment in one of the member countries. The applicant must also first 
have his mark registered in the national office of that home country. Then he may file, 
through that same national office, an application for international registration. 273 Interna-
tional registration then provides multinational notice to others that exclusive use of a 
given mark has been claimed. 
Like the Paris Union, the Madrid Agreement provides no mechanism for the detec-
tion or prosecution of counterfeit trademark violators and thus has had little deterrent 
effect on the professional counterfeiter. 274 Unlike the Paris Union, many major industrial 
Lisbon revision), and 1967 (the Stockholm revision). The Stockholm revision entered into force on 
September 5, 1970, with the exception of articles 1 through 12, which entered into force on August 
25, 1973. 21 U.S.T. 1583; 24 U.S.T. 2140 T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 7727. U.S. law also requires that 
bilateral commercial treaties with countries not signatory to the Paris Convention must contain 
provisions to ensure treatment of U.S. nationals which is no less favorable than that afforded by the 
Paris Convention. 19 U.S.C § 2435(b)(4) (1976). 
265 Walker, supra note 7, at 119. 
266 [d. 
267 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 152. 
266 [d. at 176-77. 
269 TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 263, at 243. 
270 Allen, The Trademark Registration Treaty, 21 IDEA - J. L. & Tech. 163 (1980). 
271 [d. at 165. 
212 [d. at 166. 
273 [d. 
274 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 177. 
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nations, including the United States, Britain, and Japan, are not signatories to the 
agreement for a variety of technical reasons,275 nor are any of the major counterfeiting 
nations. 276 It is no real surprise, given the narrow purpose of the Madrid Agreement, that 
it is ineffective in stopping the proliferation of counterfeiting. 
3. The Trademark Registration Treaty 
There has been a fairly recent trend by the developed non-signatory countries, 
especially the United States, to attempt to correct the much disputed inadequacies of the 
registration process under the Madrid Agreement. Between 1968 and 1970, there was an 
effort to revise the Agreement but these negotiations were fruitless. 277 In September 
1970, the United States sponsored a resolution to develop a new treaty which was 
unanimously adopted by the competent administrative organs of the Paris Union. After 
several drafts, examinations by consultant groups, and six committees of experts, a final 
draft was considered at a diplomatic conference held in Vienna from May 17 to June 12, 
1973. Fifty nations and thirty-one international organizations were represented at the 
conference. On June 12, 1973, the Trademark Registration Treaty ("TRT") was signed 
by eight nations, including the United States, and it remained open for signature until 
December 31, 1973, by which date a total of fourteen countries had signed. The TRT 
went into effect for the Soviet Union and four African nations on August 7, 1980. 278 
The failure of the United States to act effectively with regard to the TRT indicates 
the low priority Congress has accorded the problem of trademark counterfeiting. The 
implementing legislation of the TRT279 has never been adopted, nor has the Senate 
ratified the Treaty, even though the President of the United States signed the Treaty on 
September 3, 1975 with a message requesting that the Senate give its consent to ratifica-
tion.280 The U.S. Department of Justice remains opposed to the TRT and its implement-
ing legislation281 and it appears unlikely the TRT will be ratified by the 99th Congress. 
4. Other International Treaties 
The United States is party to a number of other international agreements relating to 
the issues of trademark registration and sanctions for violating the doctrine of exclusive 
use. The Nice Agreement, entered into force by the United States in 1972282 concerns the 
international classification of goods and services for the purpose of registration of trade-
marks. The Locarno Agreement, entered into force on the same day as the Nice Agree-
ment,283 establishes an international classification for industrial designs. The convention 
establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, essentially the enforcement 
arm of the Paris Union, was entered into force in 1970.284 
275 Complaints primarily center about the ease of registration for international notice and the 
protection afforded registrants in foreign nations. See Allen, supra note 270, at 165. 
276 TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 263, at 244. 
277 Allen, supra note 270, at 164. 
278 Id. at 165. 
279 973 TMOG 3 (1978). 
280 Allen, supra note 270, at 162. 
281 Id. at 174. 
282 23 U.S.T. 1353; T.l.A.S. No. 7419 (May 25, 1972). 
283 Id. 
284 21 U.S.T. 1749; T.l.A.S. No. 6932 (Aug. 25, 1970). 
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There are also a number of regional agreements that exist for the primary purpose 
of registering trademarks. The General Inter-American Convention for Trademark and 
Commercial Name Protection, in force since February 1931,285 includes most of the Latin 
American nations plus the United States and provides general trademark reciprocity 
similar to that of the Paris Union. 286 The African and Malagasy Industrial Property Office 
was created by an accord signed by the twelve member states of the African and Malagasy 
Union in September 1962, establishing a common system for the maintenance of patent 
and trademark rights, with a single deposit and centralized administration. 287 Trademark 
experts from the European Economic Community countries have drafted a trademark 
convention, but many policy questions remain unanswered, including whether U.S. 
corporations will be eligible for full or at least partial participation in the system. As a 
result, the entire convention rests in limbo. The Benelux countries have taken the most 
novel approach to international trademark law, supplanting their current national 
trademark laws with one unified, international system. 288 The impact of this decision is 
still unknown and virtually insignificant when compared to the volume of counterfeiting 
that passes no where near the Benelux countries. 
B. The Anticounterfeiting Code under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
This proposed anticounterfeiting code ("the Code"), sponsored primarily by the 
International Anticounterfeiting Coalition ("the Coalition"), is probably the most progres-
sive development in the international offensive against counterfeiting. However, partisan 
politics have forestalled its adoption. 
Negotiations in this area began during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations ("MTN") in September 1973. The Tokyo Round was the seventh major 
MTN since the end of World War II aimed at liberalizing world trade through reductions 
in tariffs and the lowering of non-tariff barriers. The negotiations were conducted under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") which is the principal mecha-
nism by which governments affect international trade. Consequently, beginning in May 
1978, a diplomatic initiative was instituted on behalf of the Coalition to introduce the 
subject of counterfeiting into the MTN. These efforts were rewarded in July 1978 when 
the Geneva negotiations agreed to a communique which contained an explicit undertak-
ing "to seek actively international agreement designed to strengthen rules and procedures 
to govern cases of trade in counterfeit goods."289 After further negotiations, an agreement 
285 The United States has been a signatory to a series of inter-American trademark conventions 
entered into from 1910-1929. These conventions include provisions similar to those of the Paris 
convention for the protection of trademarks, trade names, and indications of origin. These conven-
tions have largely become superfluous since most of the states involved are not also signatories to the 
Paris convention. The United States is a party to three conventions involving different countries: the 
Buenos Aires Convention, 39 Stat. 1675, T.S. No. 626, 1 Bevans 772 (Bolivia, Equador, and 
Uruguay); the Santiago convention, 44 Stat 2494, T.S. No. 751, 2 Bevans 395 (1923)(Brazil and the 
Dominican Republic); "and the Washington Convention, 46 Stat. 2907, T.S. No. 833, 2 Bevans, 124 
L.N.T.S. 357 (1929)(Columbia, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
and Peru). Uruguay, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Haiti are all signatories to at least 
one version of the Paris convention. 
286 Kaikati and LaGarce, supra note 15, at 60. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 DRAIT AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO DISCOURAGE THE IMPORTATION OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS, 
reprinted in Appendix G, USITC PUBLICATION 1479, supra note 28, at 135. 
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on a text was reached between the United States and the European Economic Community 
in July 1979.290 The Code still has not been adopted by the GATT membership. 
If adopted, the Code would enable trademark owners to seek the assistance of public 
authorities in all signatory countries to intercept and enforce forfeiture of all shipments 
of counterfeit merchandise seeking customs clearance. 291 lt is unclear what real effect the 
Code would have on counterfeit sales within the United States since the United States has 
already implemented the basic seizure and forfeiture provisions of the proposed Code in 
the 1978 Amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930.292 This amendment, which does not 
prevent trafficking in counterfeit goods once they clear Customs and does not reach the 
domestic counterfeit market at all,293 requires the adoption of penal sanctions for domes-
tic possession or sale of counterfeit goods and is unlikely to be adopted soon as discussed 
above. There is also a trend within the Coalition itself to extend the coverage of the Code, 
even before it has been adopted, to the counterfeiting of copyrights and patents.294 Such 
an extension would dilute domestic resources specifically targeted against trademark 
counterfeiting, much as the breadth of the Lanham Act inhibits proceedings against the 
counterfeiter. 295 The Code also places the duty of investigation and prosecution on the 
trademark owner, like the Lanham Act, instead of attempting to institute public, criminal 
sanctions. While the Code represents a step, however short, in the right direction, even its 
provisions that will produce predictably limited results against counterfeiters remain in a 
political limbo within the organs of the GATT. 
C. The Failure of International Agreements to Stem the Tide 
The common thread of inadequacy that runs through all the existing trademark 
agreements is that none are specifically designed to combat the increasing sophistication 
of the modern commercial counterfeiter. While registration is provided to prevent the 
unintentional use of another's mark and to provide priorities in disputes about own-
ership, registration is no barrier to the counterfeiter, who usually picks the most well-
known trademarks in order to make the highest profit. While the proposed Code deals 
specifically with counterfeiting, it relies upon the efficiency of domestic authorities to seize 
counterfeit goods, a reliance that is naive given the lackadaisical approach most govern-
ments, including the United States, have taken towards the problem. The best deterrent 
to counterfeiting, criminal penalties, has not been proposed under any current or 
planned agreement. 
Even when domestic laws are changed as a result of the accumulation of international 
pressure on an offending nation, the reforms are generally superficial and fail to sig-
nificantly frustrate counterfeiting operations. For example, Taiwan's new trademark 
counterfeiting law, The Rules for the Prevention of Counterfeits and Designation of False 
Place of Origin,296 enacted due to pressure from manufacturing nations, including the 
290 Walker, supra note 7, at 121-22. 
291 Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 4, at 177. 
292 [d. For a discussion of the relevant seizure provisions, see supra text accompanying notes 
138-45. 
293 [d. at 177. 
294 Walker, supra note 7, at 130. 
295 Hearings on S. 2428, supra note 5, at 71. 
296 Pow and Lee, Taiwan's Anti-Counterfeit Measures: A HazardJor Trademark Owners, 72 TRADE-
MARK REP. 157 (1982) (provides a comprehensive analysis of the new statute). 
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United States, is a legal minefield for legitimate trademark owners.297 While trademark 
owners attempt to comply with a myriad of new and confusing regulations surrounding 
registration and customs laws, certain Taiwanese counterfeit manufacturers, confident of 
the growing legitimacy of their activities, have started actively promoting their counterfeit 
goods in exhibitions alongside foreign manufacturers of legitimate goods. 298 
It is unreasonable to assume that Taiwan299 or any other nation will effectively 
respond to United States pressure to change their domestic trademark laws when it is as 
yet unclear whether even the United States has been able to act effectively with regard to 
the problem. Reform begins at home, and at the moment, no new initiatives within the 
United States or abroad seem to be gaining the type of international consensus necessary 
to make a serious dent in the counterfeiter's expansionist plans. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the seriousness of the problems created by trademark counterfeiting 
throughout the world, the United States has failed to take effective action against the 
flood of illegal counterfeits making their way into this country. The 1982 Trademark 
Counterfeiting Act was stagnated in Congress for many years. Election year politics and 
the enforcement priorities of the executive have left the future effectiveness of the 1983 
Trademark Counterfeiting Act unclear. Action on the international front is similarly 
inconclusive. The implementing legislation for the Trademark Registration Treaty, and 
the Anticounterfeiting Code under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade remain 
in political limbo. 
Each day the number of defrauded consumers grows. The sales of legitimately 
produced goods falls as markets are slowly bled dry by counterfeiters. Daily, manufactur-
ing jobs within the United States are exported abroad. The death toll from those who 
unknowingly put their lives into the hands of counterfeit goods continues to mount. To 
date, there have been no major accidents with a massive, shocking loss of life, only small 
accidents quickly reported by the media and then promptly forgotten by all except the 
grieving families involved. However, unless the paralyzed governments of the world can 
stop arguing and take strong action against those who defraud with trademarks, the 
arrogance of modern counterfeiters makes such a disaster possible in the near future. 
297 [d. at 158-60. 
298 [d. at 161. 
Robert J. Abalos 
299 Taiwan is persistently criticized by world opinion for its failure to act against counterfeiting. 
This is not unnecessary or unfair proselytizing; Taiwan is the world's leading counterfeit exporting 
nation. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. 
